

12 A 112 p. 5
DEFENSE

OF AN

ARGUMENT

Made use of in a

LETTER

To Mr D O D W E L,

To Prove

The Immateriality

And *Natural Immortality*

OF THE

S O U L.

L O N D O N,

Printed by W. B. for James Knapton, at the
Crown in St. Paul's Church-Yard. 1707.

Price Three Pence.

A
DEFENSE

OF AN
ARGUMENT

Made up of in a

LETTER

TO MR. DODWELL

To the

The University

And Annual Assembly

OF THE

SCHOOL



Printed by W. A. B. Jones, London, at the
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Price Three Pennies

A
DEFENSE
 OF AN
ARGUMENT, &c.

IN a Letter to Mr. *Dodwel*, upon occasion of his late *Discourse* concerning the Nature of the *Soul*, the following Argument was among others particularly made use of, to prove the *Immateriality* and *natural Immortality* of the *Soul*.

‘ The same thing, *viz.* that *the* Letter to
 ‘ *Soul cannot possibly be Material*, Mr. Dod-
 ‘ is moreover demonstrable from the *wel. pag.*
 ‘ single consideration even of bare 33.
 ‘ Sense and Consciousness itself. For,
 ‘ Matter being a divisible Substance,
 ‘ consisting always of separable, nay
 ‘ of actually Separate and Di-
 A 2 ‘ stinct

' distinct Parts ; 'tis plain, unless it
 ' were essentially conscious, in which
 ' case every Particle of Matter must
 ' consist of innumerable separate and
 ' distinct Consciousnesses, no System
 ' of it in any possible Composition or
 ' Division can be an Individual con-
 ' scious Being. For suppose three, or
 ' three hundred, Particles of Matter,
 ' at a Mile, or any given distance,
 ' one from another ; is it possible that
 ' all those separate Parts should in
 ' that State be one Individual consci-
 ' ous Being ? Suppose then all these
 ' Particles brought together into one
 ' System, so as to touch one ano-
 ' ther ; will they thereby, or by any
 ' Motion or Composition whatsoever,
 ' become any whit less truly distinct
 ' Beings, than they were at the
 ' greatest distance ? How then can
 ' their being disposed in any possible
 ' System, make them one Individual
 ' Conscious Being ? If you suppose
 ' God by his Infinite Power super-
 ' adding Consciousness to the uni-
 ' ted Particles, yet still those Par-
 ' ticles, being really and necessarily
 ' as distinct Beings as ever, cannot be
 ' them-



‘ themselves the Subject in which that
 ‘ Individual Consciousness inheres ;
 ‘ but the Consciousness can only be
 ‘ superadded by the addition of Some-
 ‘ thing, which in all the Particles
 ‘ must still it self be but one Individu-
 ‘ al Being. The Soul therefore, whose
 ‘ Power of Thinking is undeniably
 ‘ one Individual Consciousness, can-
 ‘ not possibly be a Material Substance.

To invalidate the force of this Ar-
 gument, the following Objections have
 been offered to the publick.

‘ I. *That* * an Individual Power * *A Letter*
 ‘ *may* reside in a Material System *containing*
 ‘ which consists of actually separate *some Re*
 ‘ and distinct parts ; *marks on a*
 ‘ *That* an Indivi- *pretended*
 ‘ dual Power *can* be lodged by God *Demon-*
 ‘ in, or superadded to That which *stration,*
 ‘ is not an Individual Being ; *&c. pag:*
 ‘ *or* ^{11.}
 ‘ *it may* follow from the Compositi-
 ‘ on or Modification of a Material Sy-
 ‘ stem consisting of actually separate
 ‘ and distinct Particles ; *And if so,*
 ‘ *then* the very Soul and strength of
 ‘ the *foregoing* Demonstration is gone.
 ‘ *That, as to this,* Matter of Fact is
 ‘ so plain and obvious, that a Man

' can't turn his Eye, but he will meet
 ' with Material Systems, wherein there
 ' are Individual Powers, which are
 ' not in every one nor in any one of
 ' the Particles that compose them,
 ' when taken apart and considered
 ' singly. *That* a Rose, *for Example*,
 ' consists of several Particles, which
 ' separately and singly want a Power
 ' to produce that agreeable Sensation
 ' we experience in them when united;
 ' And therefore either each of the
 ' Particles in that Union contributes
 ' to the Individual Power, which is
 ' the external cause of our Sensation;
 ' or else God superadds the Power
 ' of producing that Sensation in us,
 ' upon the Union of the Particles.
 ' *That* this may be the Case of Mat-
 ' ters thinking. Those Particles which
 ' compose the Brain, may under that
 ' Modification either have the Pow-
 ' er of Thinking necessarily flowing
 ' from them, or else may have the
 ' Power of Thinking superadded to
 ' them by the Power of God, tho'
 ' singly and separately they may not
 ' have the Power of Thinking. *And*
 ' *that* the Fallacy of the fore-mentio-
 ' ned

' *ned Argument* lies in this, that by
 ' an Individual Power *is there meant*
 ' a Power that can only proceed from,
 ' or reside in, an Individual Being :
 ' Which is a plain begging of the
 ' Question.

II. *That though a System of Mat-*
ter were allowed not to be capable
of Thinking, yet † it is evident, † pag. 8
that, according to the fore-going & 9.
 ' *Argument*, the separate and distinct
 ' Parts of Matter are capable of
 ' having a Power of Thinking, or
 ' an Individual Consciousness super-
 ' added to Each of them ; because the
 ' want of Individuality or Distinct-
 ' ness, is the sole Reason urged,
 ' why a System of Matter cannot have
 ' a Power of Thinking or an Indivi-
 ' dual Consciousness ; and it is only
 ' required that a Thing be an Indivi-
 ' dual Being, in order to its being a
 ' proper Subject of a Power of Think-
 ' ing, or at least *in order to its being*
 ' *a Subject to which* it may be possible
 ' for God to Superadd a power of
 ' Thinking.

III. *That, though it were allow-*
ed, * that Consciousness could re- * pag. 13!
 ' side

' side only in an Individual Being ;
 ' and also that That Individual Being
 ' must be an Immaterial Being ; yet
 ' even then the Soul would not be
 ' proved to be naturally Immortal ;
 ' that is, the Thinking Immaterial
 ' Being would not be proved to be Im-
 ' mortal, but only the bare Imma-
 ' terial Subject or Substance *it self* ;
 ' Because Thinking is an Action which
 ' may commence after the Existence
 ' of its Subject, and may perish or
 ' cease to exist, its Subject still re-
 ' maining.

† pag. 9.

IV. *That, if † an Individual Be-*
 ' ing can only be the Subject of a
 ' Power of Thinking, then, according
 ' to the foregoing Argument, either it
 ' will be proved that Material Substance
 ' is capable of Thinking, or else that
 ' neither is Immaterial Substance ca-
 ' pable of it : Because either several
 ' Particles of Matter, when united in
 ' one System, may become an Indi-
 ' vidual Being, and be by the Power
 ' of God rendred incapable of any Di-
 ' vision or Separation by Natural
 ' Causes, and consequently be a Subject
 ' capable of Thinking, or else Immaterial
 ' Substance

‘ Substance *also* may as well be concei-
 ‘ ved capable of Division, upon Suppo-
 ‘ sition that Extension is not excluded
 ‘ out of the Idea of Immateriality.

V. ‘ *That, if* * from the Power of* pag. 14.
 ‘ Thinking, or Individual Consciof-
 ‘ ness, we can prove the Immateria-
 ‘ lity of the Soul, and from its Imma-
 ‘ teriality prove its natural Immortali-
 ‘ ty ; *then* the Consequence will be,
 ‘ that all the numerous sensible Crea-
 ‘ tures in the Universe are put in
 ‘ the same condition with Man, and
 ‘ made capable of eternal Happiness
 ‘ as well as he ; *or else*, to avoid
 ‘ this Consequence, *it must be sup-*
 ‘ *posed*, *either* that all those Creatures
 ‘ are only mere Machines, *or else* that
 ‘ their Souls shall be annihilated upon
 ‘ the dissolution of their Bodies ; *And*
 ‘ *if so*, then the proof of the natural
 ‘ Immortality of *Mens* Souls from
 ‘ their Immateriality, tends not to
 ‘ prove that their Souls shall *really*
 ‘ be Immortal.

The Question being of great Im-
 portance, and the Objections very in-
 genious, as containing in brief all
 that

that can be said in Favour of *Matter's* being capable of thinking ; It is presumed it may be acceptable to the impartial Reader, to see a clear Answer given to each of them, as they are here represented in their full Strength, tho' (for Methods sake) in somewhat a different Order than they were at first published.

I. To the First, *viz.* That an individual Power may reside in a Material System ; as Sweetness, in a Rose ; And that Thinking may be supposed to do so, as well as any other Individual Power : It is answered, that 'tis so far from being true, as is alleged, that Matter of Fact is so plain and obvious, that a Man can't turn his Eye, but he will meet with Material Systems, wherein there are Individual Powers, which are not in every one, nor in any one of the Particles that compose them, when taken apart and considered singly ; This, I say, is so far from being True, that, on the contrary, 'tis both absolutely false in Fact, and impossible and a direct Contradiction in the Nature of the Thing it self, that
any

any Power whatsoever should *inhere* or *reside in*, any System or Composition of Matter, different from the Powers residing in the single Parts. For the clearer and more distinct Explication and Proof of which Doctrine, it is to be observed that all Powers or Qualities may be distinguished into Three sorts. 1st, Some Qualities there are, which do, *strictly* and *properly* speaking, *inhere* in the Substance to which they are ascribed. And concerning these, it is evident at first sight, that every Power or Quality, that is or can be *inherent* in any System of Matter, is nothing else than the Sum or Aggregate of so many Powers or Qualities of *the same kind*, inherent in all its parts. The *Magnitude* of any Body, is nothing but the Sum of the Magnitudes of all its Parts. Its *Motion*, is nothing but the Sum of the Motions of all its Parts. And if *Cogitation* in like manner could possibly be a Quality really *inherent* in a System of Matter, it must likewise necessarily be the Sum and Result of the Cogitations of the several Parts: And
so

so there would be as many distinct Consciouſnesses, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the System consists; Which I suppose will be granted to be very absurd. Compositions or Divisions of *Magnitude*, varied in infinite manners to Eternity, can produce nothing in the whole System, no Quality or Power whatsoever, but *mere Magnitude*; Compositions and Variations of *Motion*, nothing but *mere Motion*. And Sound may as well be added to a *Colour*, or *Colour* to a *Smell*; or any *Quality* be made to subsist, without any *Subject* at all; as that any Power whatsoever should be superadded to, and really made to *reside* in, any Compositum or System of Matter, without being made to inhere *proportionably* in the Parts of that Whole, taken singly as well as together. This, I say, is evidently and at first sight True, of all real Qualities, which truly and properly *inhere* in the Subject to which they belong; such as are *Magnitude*, and *Motion* in Matter. 2dly, Other Qualities there are, which are *vulgarly* looked upon as *Individual Powers*,

Powers, resulting from and residing in the whole System, without residing particularly in each or any of its single and original Parts; such as are the *Sweetness* of certain Bodies, their *Colours*, &c. But this is only a *vulgar* and very *gross* Error. For neither do these Qualities reside in, or at all result from, the whole System, in any *proper Sense*: Neither in *any Sense at all*, in which they can be ascribed to that Body or System of Matter to which they are vulgarly supposed to belong, are they truly *Individual Powers*. In the *first* place, they are not really *Qualities* of the System, and evidently do not at all in any *proper Sense* belong to it, but are only *Effects* occasionally produced by it in some other Substance, and truly Qualities or Modes of that other Substance in which they are produced; Thus the *Sweetness of a Rose*, is well known not to be a Quality really inhering in the Rose; but a *Sensation*, which is merely in him that smells it, and a Mode of the *Thinking Substance* that is in the Man. In the *next* place, these Qualities

lities, in no Sense wherein they can be ascribed to the System of Matter, are *Individual Powers*. They are Individuals, only as they are *Modes* of the Thinking Substance that perceives them ; but in the Bodies themselves, they are *only specifically*, not *individually*, single Powers ; that is, they are only a number of *similar Motions* or *Figures* of the Parts of the Body. Nay, they are not always so much as *specifically* single Powers. Thus Compound Colours, as certain *Greens*, for Example, which are *Individual Modes* in the Thinking Substance that perceives them, may in the Objects be nothing but a number of Figures or Motions *even specifically* different, namely such as usually represent both *Blue* and *Yellow*. And the same may be said of *Heat*, *Light*, *Taste*, *Sound*, and all those others which we call *Sensible Qualities*. 3dly, Other Powers, such as *Magnetism* and *Electrical Attractions*, are not *real Qualities* at all, residing in any Subject, but *merely abstract Names* to express the *Effects* of some determinate Motions of certain Streams of Mat-

Matter : And *Gravitation* it self, is not a *Quality inhering in* Matter, or that can possibly *result* from any *Texture* or *Composition* of it ; but only an *Effect* of the continual and regular *Operation* of some other Being upon it ; by which the Parts are all made to tend one towards another. Under these *three Heads* must necessarily be contained all possible *Qualites*, *Modes* or *Powers* whatsoever : They must either be *Qualities really inhering in the Subject to which they are usually ascribed* ; or *Modes produced by it in some other Subject* ; or else *mere abstract Names, signifying certain Powers or Effects that do not properly reside in any Subject at all*. And now the Question is, among which of these *Three* sorts of *Powers* must *Consciousness* or *Thinking* be reckoned. I suppose it will neither be said to be a *mere abstract Name*, nor yet an *Effect* produced in or upon a *Foreign Substance*, (as the *Sweetness* or *Colour* of a *Rose*, is not any *Individual Power* in the *Rose* it self, but merely a *Sensation* excited in him that smells or sees it ;) but that it is

is certainly a *Power* or *Quality* truly and really inhering in the Thinking Substance it self. And therefore, if that Thinking Substance be a *System of Matter*, the former Reasoning holds strictly and demonstratively true, that the Consciouſness muſt inhere in all and every one of the Particles of that System, taken ſingly, as well as together. To ſuppoſe any Power or Quality of this kind, ariſing from, or belonging to any whole System of Matter, without belonging to the ſeveral Parts, of which that Whole conſiſts, is a direct and expreſs Contradiſtion: 'Tis ſuppoſing either an *Universal* to exiſt, without *Particulars*; or an *Effect* to be produced without a *Cauſe*, or to have more in it than was in the *Cauſe*; or that a *Quality* is by the Power of God made ſo to ariſe out of Nothing, as to be ſuperadded to a *Subject*, and to ſubſiſt without inhering in that Subject to which it is at the ſame time ſuppoſed to belong. By this I preſume it ſufficiently appears with what poſſibility of Truth it is alleged, that the *Particles of Matter*

Matter which compose the Brain, may under that Modification either have the Power of Thinking necessarily flowing from them, or else may have the Power of Thinking superadded to them by the Power of God, though singly and separately they may not have the Power of Thinking. And it will easily be judged, whether it be indeed a Fallacy and a plain begging of the Question, to affirm that an Individual Power, properly and strictly speaking, such as Consciousness or Thinking must needs be acknowledged to be, can only proceed from, or reside in, an Individual Being; or whether the contrary be not rather demonstrated to be a plain Contradiction.

II. To the Second, *viz.* That, according to the Argument now under Consideration, if not a *System* of Matter, yet at least the *separate and distinct* Parts of Matter, are capable of having a Power of Thinking, or an Individual Consciousness superadded to Each of them; seeing it is only required that a thing be an Individual Being,

B

ing,

ing, in order to its being a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking : It is answered, First, that supposing any Particle of Matter could be truly an Individual, that is, an Indivisible or Indiscerpible Being; yet it would not therefore follow, that it could be capable of Thinking. For though Divisibility or Discerpibility in any Subject, is a sufficient Proof that That Subject is not capable of such an individual Power as Thinking; yet it does not from thence presently follow on the contrary, that whatever is Indiscerpible, is therefore capable of Thinking. Though the present Argument proves indeed only, that whatever is Discerpible, cannot Think; that is, that Individuality is a *sine qua non*, or a necessary Qualification without which no Subject can be capable of Thinking; yet it does by no means exclude other Considerations, or at all imply that whatever has this Property of Individuality, must therefore necessarily be capable of Thinking and cannot by any other Property be rendred, or by any other Argument proved to be, incapable

incapable of it. Though *the want of Individuality or Distinctness*, is indeed *the sole Reason* urged in the present Argument, *why a System of Matter cannot have a Power of Thinking or an Individual Consciousness*; yet it ought not therefore to be said, that *it is Only required that a Thing be an Individual Being, in order to its being a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking*. Besides; Supposing any Particle of Matter could be truly an Individual Being, and also that upon that account (which yet is by no means necessary) it could be capable of Thinking; yet still the principal part of the Question would be certain and unavoidable, that a Thinking Being must be, if not Immaterial, yet however *naturally Immortal*: For whatever is Indiscerpible, tho' it were supposed Material, could not by any Power of Time, or any Force in Nature, receive any such Alteration, but that not only its Substance, but even all its Qualities also, must naturally remain for ever unchanged. But then, Secondly, it is answered further, that the Suppositi-

on it self of this Objection, is utterly impossible, *viz.* that any Particle of Matter can be truly an Individual or Indiscerpible Being. For it is necessarily included in the Nature of Solid Substance, how *small* soever it be conceived to be, to consist still of Parts not essentially connected, and not at all depending upon each other for their Existence. So that it is absolutely impossible and contradictory, to suppose any Particle of Matter so truly an Individual, but that by the Power of God (for the *Powers of Nature* here are nothing to the purpose,) it may be divided into two or more Particles, which shall each of them separately be as Perfect and Complete Matter, and continue to have all the very same Properties, as the whole Particle had before it was divided. Suppose then the smallest imaginable Particle of Matter, indued with Consciousness or Thought: Yet by the Power of God, this Particle may be divided into two distinct Parts; and then what will naturally and consequently become of its

its Power of Thinking ? *If* That Power will continue in it unchanged ; then there must either be two distinct Consciousnesses ; in the two separate Parts ; or else the Power continuing in the intermediate Space, as well as in the Parts themselves, must there subsist without a Subject ; or else, not the Material Substance, but some other Thing, is the Subject of the Consciousness. *If* the Power of Thinking will remain only in One of the separated Parts ; then either That One Part only, had at first the Power residing in it ; and then the same Question will return, upon the Supposition of *Its* being likewise divided ; or else it will follow that one and the same Individual Quality may be transferred from one Subject to another ; which all Philosophers of all Sects in the World, have always confessed to be impossible. *If*, in the last place, it be said, that, upon the Division of the Particle, the Power of Thinking, which was in it, will wholly cease ; then it will follow, that That Power was

never at all a real Quality inhering or residing in the Substance, (in which mere separation of Parts, makes no Alteration;) but that it was *merely an external Denomination*, such as is *Roundness* in a Globe, which perishes at its being divided: And this, I suppose, will be granted to be sufficiently absurd. There is no way to evade this Argument, but by affirming either that a Particle of Matter may be so small, as that it shall not be in the Power of God to divide it; or that, if it be divided, it will consequently and necessarily be annihilated; (neither of which, I suppose, will be affirmed;) or else that the same may be argued concerning Immaterial Substance also; which is the *Fourth* Objection, and will be considered presently in its proper place.

III. To the Third, *viz.* That though *Consciousness* were allowed necessarily to infer *Indivisibility*, and *Indivisibility* to infer *Immateriality*: yet even then not *the Soul*, the *Thinking Immaterial Being*, but only the
bare

bare Immaterial Subject or Substance itself, would be proved to be naturally Immortal ; since Thinking is an Action (a Power it should rather have been call'd,) which may commence after the Existence of its Subject, and may cease, its Subject still remaining : It is answered, that the contrary is evidently True ; namely, that not only the bare Immaterial Subject, but the Subject and the Power together, the Thinking Immaterial Being it self, is hereby proved to be naturally Immortal : Because, whatever Substance is wholly indiscerpible, is plainly, by Virtue of that property, not only it self incapable of being destroyed by any Natural Power, (for so also is the most discernible Substance likewise ;) but all its Qualities and Modes also, are utterly incapable of being affected in any measure, or changed in any degree, by any Power of Nature ; For all real and inherent Qualities of any Substance, are either Modifications of the Substance it self, or else Powers super-added and connected to the Substance,

stance, by the immediate Power
 of God ; And in either of these
 cases, 'tis manifest no *Quality* can
 be altered by any natural Power,
 which is not able to affect and
 make some Alteration (in the Dis-
 position of the Parts at least) of
 the *Substance* it self ; which in an
indiscerpible Substance 'tis evident
 cannot be done. The *Soul* there-
 fore, the *whole Conscious Being* ; the
Power of Thinking that resides in it,
 as well as the *bare Immaterial Sub-
 ject or Substance* it self ; (whatever
 may be said concerning the *Power
 of God* in this Question ;) will
 clearly, notwithstanding what any
Finite Power can do, of necessity
 be *naturally Immortal*. The Truth
 of this Reasoning is evident from
 what we cannot but observe even in the
Material World ; namely, that all the
 Changes which are caused therein
 by any Powers of Nature , are
 nothing but Changes of the order
 and Disposition of the Parts of
 compound Bodies. The original and
 perfectly solid Particles of Matter,
 which are, (not indeed absolutely
 in

in themselves, but) to any Power of Nature, indiscerpible ; are utterly incapable of having not only their Substance, but even any of their Qualities or Properties altered in any measure by any Power of Nature : As is evident from the Form or Species of those we vulgarly call simple or elementary Bodies, remaining always unalterably the same, and indued continually with the same Powers and Qualities.

IV. To the Fourth, *viz.* That, according to the Argument we are now considering, either a *System of Matter*, being by a strict Union of Parts made an Individual Being, may become *capable of Thinking* ; or else *Immaterial Substance* also may as well be conceived capable of *Division*, and consequently incapable of Thought ; *supposing Extension not excluded out of the Idea of Immateriality* : It is answered, that the Case is very different : Because some of the *first and most obvious Properties*

Properties which we *certainly know* of *Matter*, as its having *partes extra partes*, strictly and properly speaking, that is, its consisting of such Parts as are *actually unconnect- ed* and are *truly distinct Beings*, and *can* (as we see by Experience) *exist separately*, and *have no dependence one upon another*; do necessarily and confessedly imply *Discerpibility*: But in *Immaterial Beings* we do *not know* of any such Properties, as any wise imply *Discerpibility*. It cannot be collected from any Property we know of *Them*, but that they *may* be such Beings as can no more be divided than annihilated, that is, whose whole Essence may be necessarily One, and their Substance essentially indivisible, upon the same Ground as their Existence continues: Nay, the *only* Properties we *certainly and indisputably* know of them, namely *Consciousness* and its Modes, do prove (as has been before shown) that they *must necessarily* be such Indiscerpible Beings. As evidently as the
known

known Properties of *Matter* prove it to be certainly a *Discernible Substance*, whatever other *unknown Properties* it may be endued with; so evidently the *known and confessed Properties* of *Immaterial Beings* prove them to be *Indiscernible*, whatever other *unknown Properties* They likewise may be indued with. How far such *Indiscernibility* can be reconciled and be consistent with some kind of *Expansion*; that is, what *unknown Properties* are joyned together with these *known ones* of *Consciousness* and *Indiscernibility*; is another Question of considerable Difficulty, but of no Necessity to be resolved in the present Argument. Only This: As the Parts of *Space* or *Expansion* it self, can demonstrably be proved to be *absolutely Indiscernible*; so it ought not to be reckoned an insuperable Difficulty, to imagine that all *Immaterial Thinking Substances* (upon Supposition that *Expansion* is not excluded out of their Idea,) may be so likewise.


V. To

V. To the Fifth, viz. That, by the fore-mentioned Argument, *all the sensible Creatures in the Universe are put in the same Condition with Man, and made capable of eternal Happiness as well as he; or else, that, to avoid this Consequence, all those Creatures must either be supposed to be only mere Machines, or else that their Souls shall be annihilated upon the dissolution of their Bodies; And if so, then the Proof of the natural Immortality of Mens Souls from their Immateriality, tends not to prove that their Souls shall really be Immortal: It is answered, that, though all Sensible Creatures have certainly in them something that is Immaterial, yet it does not at all follow, either that they must needs be annihilated upon the Dissolution of their Bodies, or else that they must be capable of Eternal Happiness as well as Man. This is just such an Argument, as if a Man should conclude, that whatsoever is not exactly like himself, can there-*
fore

fore have no Being at all ; Or that all the Stars of Heaven, if they be not exactly like our Globe of Earth, cannot possibly be any Globes at all. Certainly the Omnipotent and infinitely Wise God may, without any very great difficulty, be supposed to have more ways of disposing of his Creatures, than we are at present let into the secret of. He may indeed, if he please, annihilate them at the dissolution of their Bodies ; (And so he might, if he thought fit, annihilate the Souls of Men ; and yet it would be never the less true, that they are in *in their own Nature Immortal* ;) or he may, if he pleases, without either annihilating them or suffering them to fall into a State of entire Inactivity, dispose of them into *numberless* States, concerning the particular Nature of which, we are not now able to make the least conjecture. I suppose, That Man does not do any great Honour either to God, or to the Christian Religion, who will needs contend

contend, that thro' a boundless Eternity there shall never exist any thing in the immense Universe, but what must needs partake either of the Happiness or Misery of *Man-kind*.

FINIS.



A Second

DEFENSE

OF AN

ARGUMENT

Made in

LETTER

TO MR. DODGE

To Prove

The Immortality

And Natural Immortality

OF THE

SOUL

As a Test to the Truth of A. R. D. to
the Editor of the

